INTRODUCTION
"How can you not be romantic about baseball?" Imagine a warm summer 1 evening in Rome, Georgia. This city of just under 36,000 residents is home to the 2 Rome Braves, the Class-A affiliate of the Atlanta Braves. State Mutual Stadium 3 is filled to capacity as the local residents pack the stands to cheer on their hometown Braves. The smell of peanuts, popcorn, and hotdogs emanates 4 throughout the stadium. A beer vendor climbs up and down the stadium steps hollering, "Ice cold beer!" Between innings, children are brought out on the field to partake in on-field promotions. After the game, these same children line up to run the bases, meet the mascot, and enjoy the postgame firework display. This minor league game brings the people of Rome, Georgia together and provides them with a common identity.
Bradley Reynolds, general manager of the Double-A Mobile BayBears, highlighted the importance of minor league baseball when he said, "What keeps fans coming back isn't baseball. If they want a better baseball game, they can see it on ESPN. This is about affordability, family fun, wholesome entertainment. They'll come to Iowa for reasons they can't even fathom . . . It's only $20 per person. They'll pass over the money without even thinking about it: for it is money they have and peace they lack. And they'll walk out to the bleachers; sit in shirtsleeves on a perfect afternoon. They'll find they have reserved seats somewhere along one of the baselines, where they sat when they were children and cheered their heroes. And they'll watch the game and it'll be as if they dipped themselves in magic waters. The memories will be so thick they'll have to brush them away from their faces . . . The one constant through all the years . . . has been baseball. America has rolled by like an army of steamrollers. It has been erased like a blackboard, rebuilt and erased again. But baseball has marked the time. This field, this game: it's a part of our past . . . It reminds us of all that once was good and it could be again.
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This colloquy exemplifies people's emotional connection to the game of baseball. Although some argue baseball is slipping in terms of popularity, Americans' 8 continued passion for baseball cannot be measured simply by looking at metrics such as television ratings-an admittedly unscientific process. Instead, baseball's 9 relevance must be looked at for what it has provided to millions of people for well over a century-"local fan-base fervor and enduring cultural relevance."
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Baseball is different from any other sport, both on and off the field. Nothing better exemplifies this on-field difference than when Ted Williams, one of the greatest hitters ever to play the game, said, "Baseball is the only field of endeavor where a man can succeed three times out of ten and be considered a good performer." The off-field difference between baseball and other sports is a bit 11 more drastic. Baseball is the only professional sports league immune from U.S. antitrust laws, and this immunity extends to the minor leagues. 12 With the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust in the near future, potentially spelling trouble for the minor leagues. The purpose of this Note is to discuss the importance of Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption for the continued existence and success of Minor League Baseball. In particular, this Note explains the impact of restricting Minor League Baseball teams from relocating and paying their players above a prescribed minimum, and looks at potential challenges to the exemption that could affect Minor League Baseball. Part I discusses the unique structure of both Major League Baseball and Minor League Baseball, including franchise relocation and pay structure. Part II focuses on antitrust laws in the United States, notably the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the goals of antitrust law, and the different methods of analyzing antitrust cases. Part III explores the origin of the Supreme Court's antitrust exemption for Major League Baseball and cases that have furthered the exemption. Finally, Part IV argues the importance of Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption for the survival of Minor League Baseball. Specifically, given the Supreme Court's decisions in antitrust cases, professional baseball's location requirements and pay structure would likely be found to violate antitrust laws. As a result, drastic changes would occur within the landscape of Minor League Baseball if the antitrust exemption is repealed, depriving small-market cities from enjoying minor league baseball and overall decreasing consumer welfare.
I. STRUCTURE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL

A. Major League Baseball
The structure and operation of MLB is governed by the Major League Constitution (hereinafter "League Constitution" League Baseball because it preserves the integral structure of professional baseball.
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Minor league clubs must follow strict regulations before franchise relocation is allowed. First, a minor league franchise wishing to relocate must "notify in 55 writing the Commissioner and the President of its Minor League Association of its intention to relocate at least 18 months before opening day of the season in which it would begin operations at the new location." After receiving written 56 notification of a team's desire to relocate, "the President of the Club's Minor League Association shall require the Minor League Club proposing the relocation to establish that improved business operations (taking into account the quality of the playing facility and classification of play involved) and/or improved player development will be achieved at the proposed new location." If the President 57 approves the relocation, the proposal is sent along to the Commissioner who reviews the decision, giving deference to the President. The Commissioner may 58 overturn the President's approval for relocation if the Commissioner concludes:
(1) that the President of the Minor League Association failed in some material respect to adhere to the review and approval procedures in this Rule 53; (2) that the President . . . abused his or her discretion in approving the proposed relocation; or (3) that the relocation would not be in the best interests of Baseball.
59
D. Minor League Baseball's Pay Structure
In addition to controlling franchise location, the Major League Rules control salary rates for minor league baseball players. The Rules require all contracts 60 to be in the "form of the Minor League Uniform Contract" and " [a] Under this directive, the typical minor league salary ranges from $1100 per month for players in short-season leagues to $2150 per month for players in Triple-A. This restriction on the amount of pay for minor leaguers is, in essence, 63 a naked price-fixing arrangement among member clubs, making it ripe for antitrust challenge and posing a serious threat to baseball's antitrust exemption.
II. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
A. Goals of Antitrust Laws
In passing the Sherman Act, Congress intended "to protect consumers from the high prices and reduced output caused by monopolies and cartels." Compare 65 this with the legislative history of the Clayton Act, which suggests the passage of this Act was "concerned with the protection of small businesses from the unfair or 'exclusionary' practices of bigger firms." Additionally, Congress passed the We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are others, based upon the belief that great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results . . . [A]mong the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them . . . Throughout the history of [the antitrust] statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other. 74 Chief Justice Warren used a similar justification for the goal of antitrust law when he asserted that the Court "cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. productive efficiency is a product of a firm's research and development. It is "a 79 fraction in which the value of a firm's output is the numerator and the value of its inputs is the denominator; the higher this ratio, the more efficient the firm." The promoting economic efficiency creates a "dichotomy" between efficiency maximization "equity objectives" (i.e., political and social goals) and places these equity objectives outside the purview of antitrust. Economic efficiency-and 85 antitrust policy in general-seeks to protect "'competition,' not 'competitors. '" 86 In looking at the legislative history and recent Supreme Court cases, John Kirkwood argued consumer protection is the only rational goal of antitrust law. 
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Elaborating on his interpretation of the goal of antitrust law, Kirkwood explained, "The fundamental goal of antitrust . . . is to protect consumers in the relevant market from anticompetitive behavior that exploits them-that unfairly transfers their wealth to firms with market power-not to increase the total wealth of society." Furthermore, advocates for the prevention of wealth transfers and 88 consumer protection claim Congress passed the antitrust laws with a distributive goal in mind, namely "preventing unfair acquisitions of consumers' wealth by firms with market power." A consumer-oriented law must employ economic theory to judge which market structures and practices are harmful and which beneficial.
Modern antitrust has performed this task very poorly. . . [C]ourts, and particularly the Supreme Court, have failed to understand and give proper weight to the crucial concept of business efficiency. Since productive efficiency is one of the two opposing forces that determine the degree of consumer well-being . . . this failure has skewed the legal doctrine disastrously. Business efficiency necessarily benefits consumers by lowering the costs of goods and services or by increasing the value of the product or service offered; this is true whether the business unit is a competitor or a monopolist.
94
Although never explicitly pronouncing consumer welfare as the current goal of antitrust law, "courts almost invariably apply a consumer welfare test If subject to antitrust scrutiny (i.e., not exempt), professional baseball's pay structure would be in violation of the antitrust laws as a horizontal price-fixing agreement. Under this theory, the constituent professional clubs have agreed with each other to set prices that will be paid to minor league players. Specifically, this wage structure "results in the per se antitrust violation of price fixing, at artificially low levels, the compensation minor league players can receive, by preventing minor league players from offering their services to competing teams who, in a competitive market, would offer them more for their services." at different levels of the distribution chain agree to divide a specified market.
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Although horizontal market allocation has traditionally been analyzed under a per se approach, the legality of vertical market allocation is determined under the challenge to baseball's location requirements comes out differently, teams would have the ability to move freely into other teams' territories. As a result, smallmarket teams would flee to larger cities where they can earn higher revenues, decreasing consumer welfare in the cities that lose their teams.
III. SUPREME COURT'S BASEBALL "TRILOGY" AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CASES . . . centers in the uniformity of player contracts; the confinement of the player to the club that has him under the contract; the assignability of the player's contract; and the ability of the club annually to renew the contract unilaterally, subject to a stated salary minimum." Specifically, the reserve system "was a provision in 132 baseball contracts that prevented players from signing with other clubs, even after their contracts had expired, without the express consent of the club they played for." It "served to bind every player to his club indefinitely, because the clause 
B. A Rationale So Far Removed
Today, the Supreme Court's rationale in Federal Baseball for the creation of baseball's antitrust exemption is so far removed from reality. Federal Baseball is a holdover from the Populist Era when the goals of antitrust law were other than that of pure economic efficiency. No one can legitimately argue that baseball games are "purely state affairs." Take, for example, MLB's National League to adhere to, makes baseball's antitrust exemption prone to review. As such, in order to maintain professional baseball's current structure, preservation of the antitrust exemption is required.
C. A Departure from Precedent
Even with the "Trilogy" as precedent, two courts have expressly limited baseball's antitrust exemption. exemption's rationale, Miranda appears to be a serious threat to baseball's exemption, resulting in major changes to the minor league system. Therefore, 196 the continued vitality of the exemption is more important now than ever before.
IV. NECESSITY OF THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION FOR THE MINOR LEAGUES
Nearly forty million Americans attended a Minor League Baseball game during the 2014 season. In terms of the games themselves, the minor league 197 games are seemingly the same as the major leagues, the only difference being an increased level of talent and name recognition in MLB. These differences aside, 198 the minor leagues provide something the major leagues cannot.
In effect, the Major League Rules and Major League Constitution tell their constituent clubs where they will be located. Antitrust law would necessarily 199 render this sort of agreement illegal.
As a result, the market would be 200 competitive and teams would be free to impede upon the operating territory of other teams. Clubs would relocate to cities where they could maximize their 201 revenue through ticket sales and, unsurprisingly, this revenue maximization would not happen in places like Rome, Georgia. Rather, large metropolitan areas would provide teams with the greatest economic success. In 1981, the NCAA adopted a new television plan that was intended to reduce the negative effects of live broadcasts on college football game attendance. The 207 plan required that eighty-two different college football teams appear on television during a two-year period. Furthermore, no school could appear on television 208 "more than a total of six times and more than four times nationally, with the appearances to be divided equally between the two carrying networks." In 209 essence, the television plan limited the total number of televised college football games and the number of televised games in which any one institution could appear.
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After institutions began negotiating television contracts with an unaffiliated television company, the NCAA announced it would take disciplinary action against any institution that disobeyed the NCAA's television plan. As a result 
